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Why Old Things Matter 
 
It is, I suggest, unclear whether any old inanimate objects deserve to be treated with 
respect simply because they are old. Yet this does not entail that an object’s age has 
no bearing at all on the question of how it may permissibly be treated. I defend the 
claim that those who fail to take seriously the histories of old inanimate objects 
typically deserve to be criticised on aretaic grounds. Such people, I argue, tend to lack 
the virtue of humility. 
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Many old inanimate objects are thought to deserve respectful treatment. In some instances, 
this is because they are taken to have a special historical or archaeological significance; in 
others, because the process of ageing has increased their aesthetic value - by twisting them 
into baroque and beautiful forms, for example. In other cases, they are thought to deserve 
respectful treatment because long years of use have worn away their lacquer or in some other 
way rendered them vulnerable to damage. Indeed, a single old object might be thought to 
deserve respectful treatment for several reasons: not just because it is, for instance, of 
historical interest, but also because it is both elegant and fragile. 
It is reasonable to think that these sorts of judgements are largely correct and that 
many old inanimate objects do in fact deserve to be treated with respect. But it is less clear 
whether any of them deserve such treatment simply because they are old. In fact the 
suggestion that any of them do might seem very implausible. One can see – the sceptic will 
contend – why an entity that is rational might deserve to be treated with respect simply 
because it is rational. And although biocentrism is a controversial position, it is not absurd to 
think that the mere fact that an entity is alive marks it out as worthy of respectful treatment. 
But age? It is not at all clear why the mere fact that something has been around for a long 
time (however we define ‘a long time’) provides a reason to think it is worthy of respectful 
treatment. 
This scepticism is to an extent justified. For reasons I consider below, the claim that 
great age per se renders an object worthy of respectful treatment is vulnerable to several 
forceful objections. Yet I contend that these objections do not entail that an object’s age has 
no bearing on the matter of how it may permissibly be treated. On the contrary, I argue that 
those who fail to take seriously the histories of old inanimate objects typically deserve to be 
criticised on aretaic grounds. Such people, I suggest, tend to lack the virtue of humility. 
 
1. 
 
Three clarifications: 
First, this paper is not about respect for the elderly. My general concern is with the 
question of how it is appropriate to treat inanimate objects – not just artefacts, such as Roman 
amphorae and medieval bridges, but natural objects too, such as mountains and stalagmites. 
Second, before we can consider whether such objects deserve special treatment 
simply because they are old, some account must be provided of what an object must be like if 
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it is to qualify as old. This is no small task, and I will have more to say about the property of 
oldness below. But for the moment I will assume, if only provisionally, that an object only 
counts as old if it has existed for more than the usual span of a human life (which, taking 
technologically developed societies as a model, I take to be seventy years).
1
 
Third, by respect I mean an attitude which has several essential characteristics, of 
which one is that it is called for by an object - ‘commanded, elicited, due, claimed from us’, 
as Robin S. Dillon puts it.
2
 What is claimed is, first of all, our attention. If an object deserves 
respect then it calls for being taken seriously, for being given appropriate weight in our 
deliberations. It has a certain sort of importance – though not necessarily a moral importance 
– that it is in some sense incumbent upon one to acknowledge. In many instances, moreover, 
this attention can be exhibited in action, which is to say that it is frequently the case that 
respect-worthy objects deserve to be not merely regarded with respect but also treated with 
respect. This treatment can take a number of different forms, depending, amongst other 
things, on the nature of the object, the status of those who have dealings with it, and the 
context in which those dealings take place. Whereas a priest might exhibit her respect for a 
sacred artefact by handling it with care, a layperson might express his by staying well clear of 
the thing, except, maybe, on Holy Days, when the norms of respectful treatment will require 
him to behave in a subdued manner in its presence. For our purposes, it is important to note 
that treating an inanimate object with respect tends to preclude using it carelessly. So the 
woman who respects a certain object will be unlikely to use it as a foot-rest, say, or tap 
cigarette ash into it. In Western cultures at least, those sorts of actions epitomise disrespectful 
treatment.
3
 
 
2. 
 
As Dillon observes: 
 
respect involves believing that there is something about the object, some feature of it 
or fact about it, that makes it worthy of [special] attention and treatment. This fact or 
feature is the ground of respect: that in virtue of which it is worthy of respect... [O]ur 
reason for respecting the object must be that it has, in our judgment, that respect-
warranting characteristic…4 
 
                                                     
1
 I concede that this rather arbitrary stipulation has some counterintuitive implications. For instance, it implies 
that a miraculously vigorous mayfly that lived to see its twentieth birthday would not count as old. But I ask 
readers to set aside mayfly Methuselahs and other problematic cases for the moment and focus their attention on 
those objects, such as Egyptian sarcophagi and Roman vases, which both (a) seem intuitively to be old and (b) 
qualify as old by the lights of my provisional (and admittedly inadequate) definition.  
2
 ‘Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1) (1992), pp. 105-32, at p. 
108. 
3
 I am therefore referring to a particular variety of what Stephen Darwall called ‘recognition respect’: something 
similar, perhaps, to the attitude Dillon calls ‘care respect’, which involves ‘cherishing some object, regarding it 
as having great value and as fragile or calling for special care’. See Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, Ethics 88 
(1977), pp. 36-49; Dillon, ‘Respect and Care’, pp. 112, 116. 
4
 Dillon, ‘Respect and Care’, p.109. 
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Is the property of being old (or, alternatively, the mere fact that something is old) a respect-
warranting characteristic? Do old things deserve to be treated with respect simply because 
they are old? 
Geoffrey Cupit, for one, has suggested that they do. Near the end of an interesting 
discussion of respect for the elderly, he makes the tentative suggestion that such people 
deserve respect since they are comparatively ‘large’, in the sense of being more extended in 
time, and large things tend to command our respect, not just on account of their power or 
other size-related property, but simply because they are large.
5
 After all, he notes, ‘Old trees 
and forests, old buildings, ancient artifacts, and geological features are often treated as 
deserving a certain respect on the basis of their age.’6 In fact it is, he suggests, plausible that 
in such cases ‘respect is due to what is old simply because it is old.’7 
 Consider this last statement: the claim that old objects are not just respected but 
deserve respect. Its veracity is difficult to assess. For although we often think that old 
inanimate objects deserve to be treated with respect, we are in many such cases responding, 
not to their age per se, but merely to some age-related and respect-grounding property that we 
take them to possess. For example, as noted above, an old inanimate object might be thought 
to deserve respectful treatment not simply because it is old but because it is fragile or 
evocative of some historical time period, or because, like vintage wine, its aesthetic qualities 
have been enhanced by a long period of maturation. 
Matters are further complicated by the fact that whether or not old objects actually 
deserve to be treated with respect because of their age, they are in some cases thought to 
deserve such treatment on account of their age. It follows that even if it is not the case that an 
old inanimate object deserves to be treated with respect simply because it is old, it could 
nonetheless deserve some sort of special treatment because certain people think that its age 
renders it worthy of respectful treatment, and because we are obliged to take these people’s 
views into account in our dealings with it.
8
 Or put more simply: it may sometimes be the case 
                                                     
5
 ‘Justice, Age, and Veneration’, Ethics 108 (1998), pp. 702-18, at pp. 717-18. 
6
 Cupit, ‘Justice, Age, and Veneration’, p. 717. Hume gives an interesting account of why we respect old 
objects, though one that I will not address in any detail in this paper. Very briefly, he argues that although we 
take ancient objects to deserve ‘esteem and admiration’, those attitudes are primarily directed towards the vast 
span of time that separates us from the object’s origins. On the one hand, this is simply because the vastness of 
that span of time will arouse in us the ‘sensible delight and pleasure’ we find in contemplating any ‘great and 
magnificent’ thing. On the other hand, Hume suggests that since the distance separating us from the origins of 
the ancient object is temporal and not just spatial, contemplating it tends to stretch our imaginative faculties; and 
he maintains that this, too, creates in us a feeling of admiration for the object, which, again, gets transferred by a 
process of association onto the object itself. These claims are of course open to question. For one thing, the 
tendency to experience ‘sensible delight and pleasure’ when contemplating any ‘great and magnificent’ thing 
does not appear to be universal. Thus for one seventeenth-century commentator, ‘Vast Things differ mightily 
from those which make an agreeable Impression upon us... Vast Forest put [sic] us into a fright; the Sight loses 
it self [sic] in looking over Vast Plains… Rivers too large, Overflowings and Inundations displease us by the 
Noise and Violence of their Billows, and our Eyes cannot with any Pleasure behold their Vast Extent.’ (Charles 
de Saint-Évremond , quoted in Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The 
Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (New York: W. W. Norton and Co, 1959), pp. 31-2. See further, 
David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Penguin, 1969 [1739]), Part III, sections 7 and 8. 
7
 Cupit, ‘Justice, Age, and Veneration’, p. 717.) 
8
 I do not say that an object might deserve to be treated with respect simply because of the interests certain 
people take in it, since in such cases it is not clear whether the respect is directed towards the object itself or 
simply the people who respect it. Be that as it may, it is reasonable to think that an object might deserve some 
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that we should take special care in our dealings with old things because we should give due 
consideration to the interests of those people who respect them because of their age.
9
 
Even more complications arise when one considers the possibility that some objects 
deserve to be treated with respect because we have certain obligations to those past 
individuals who cared about them – their makers, perhaps, or those who preserved them for 
future generations. For example, one of the many reasons we might resist plans to demolish 
part of Stonehenge to make room for the amusement rides of Flintstone World would be 
because implementing such a plan would run counter to the interests of those who hauled the 
rocks to the site and set them in place, and to all of those people, now mostly long dead, who 
preserved the site so that it could be enjoyed by us. That, we might think, is why Stonehenge 
deserves to be treated with respect: not exactly because it is old, but because it meant so 
much to so many past people. 
 
3. 
 
For these reasons, it is in many cases difficult to assess whether an old object that deserves 
special treatment deserves to be so treated on account of its age per se, or simply because it 
possesses one or more other age-related properties. In the following, I will not defend the 
claim that old inanimate objects deserve to be treated with respect simply because they are 
old. But I will argue that those who fail to take account of the histories of such objects 
typically lack a certain virtue – namely, humility. 
 Before presenting this argument, something needs to be said to explain what humility 
is. It is, indeed, particularly important to do this since the virtue can be conceived in a number 
of different, sometimes conflicting, ways. Julia Driver construes humility
10
 as a disposition 
unintentionally to underestimate one’s self-worth to some limited extent, even in spite of the 
available evidence. For Iris Murdoch, by contrast, it is a ‘selfless respect for reality’ and so 
quite unlike those traits Driver calls virtues of ignorance.
11
 Others proffer different accounts: 
for G. F. Schueler humility is a disposition not to care whether other people are impressed by 
one’s achievements; for David Horner a state which ‘honors others and esteems them as 
superior’; for Vance Morgan a tendency  to believe oneself ‘to be beneath others’.12 
                                                                                                                                                                     
sort of special treatment simply because certain people think (rightly or wrongly) that it deserves to be treated 
with respect and because we are obliged to take their views into account. 
9
 Or more controversially: it may sometimes be the case that we should be careful in our dealings with old 
things because we should give due consideration  to the interests of those currently existing people who once 
respected them because of their age but now do not respect them at all. Or more controversially still: it may 
sometimes be the case that we should be careful in our dealings with old things because we should give due 
consideration to the interests of those now-dead people who once respected them because of their age. 
10
 She calls it ‘modesty’. In the following, I take ‘humility’ and ‘modesty’ to be synonymous. See Driver, 
‘Modesty and Ignorance’, Ethics 109 (4) (1999), pp. 827-34, at p. 830. 
11
 Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Penguin, 1997), 
p. 378; see further, Tony Milligan, ‘Murdochian Humility’, Religious Studies 43 (2) (2007), pp. 217-28, at p. 
219.  
12
 See G. F. Schueler, ‘Why IS Modesty a Virtue?’ Ethics 109 (4) (1999), pp. 835-41; David Horner, ‘What it 
Takes to be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on Magnanimity’, Faith and Philosophy 15 (4) (1998): 415-44, at p. 
434; Vance Morgan, ‘Humility and the Transcendent’, Faith and Philosophy 18 (3) (2001), pp. 307-22, at p. 
315.  
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This is just a sample of the numerous accounts that have been offered; I will not try to 
survey them all.
13
 For present purposes, it will suffice to note that although the nature of 
humility is widely disputed, there is considerably more agreement about what sorts of actions 
would be ‘out of character’ for a humble person. All agree that a humble person will not tend 
to talk about herself excessively, and that she will not be given to boasting. All agree that she 
will not tend to overestimate her own worth and status, or the worth of her own projects and 
achievements. Most commentators believe that, being largely unconcerned with such matters, 
the humble person will not spend much time comparing her own abilities, projects and 
achievements with those of others.
14
 
There is general agreement, then, that humility is incompatible with boasting, a 
preoccupation with self-assessment, etc. The incompatibility, here, is a relation weaker than 
logical incompatibility. As Aristotle observes, ethics tends to deal with ‘things that are only 
for the most part true’, and indeed it is not logically impossible for a humble individual to 
boast, for instance.
15
 He might simply be having an ‘off day’; or he might have misread the 
social situation in which he finds himself. However, the incompatibility in question must be 
more than mere statistical divergence. It cannot simply be the case that there just so happens 
to be a negative correlation between humility and actions such as talking excessively about 
oneself or trumpeting one’s achievements. The relevant relation is, I think, analogous to that 
which obtains between delivering a religious sermon and uttering profanities. There is no 
logical incompatibility here. An unorthodox preacher might deliberately swear in order to 
make a religious point, and even a conservative preacher might stub his toe on the font and, 
for a moment, forget himself. But it is not the case that preachers just so happen to avoid the 
use of profanities. Rather, the use of profanities tends to be inappropriate in religious 
contexts. It is in this sense that the use of such language is incompatible with the delivering of 
sermons. Similarly, being humble is incompatible with actions such as boasting, trumpeting 
one’s successes, and so forth. 
These actions all involve the overestimation of one’s own worth or status relative to 
that of one’s peers. Yet one can exhibit a lack of humility in many different ways – not just 
by thinking oneself superior to one’s peers but (for instance) by overestimating one’s own 
abilities relative to other sorts of entities, as when a professional wrestler compares his 
strength to that of a bull or (more hubristically still) a bulldozer. Furthermore, it is possible to 
exhibit a lack of humility by failing to appreciate the extent to which one’s own achievements 
depend on factors not of one’s making, such as one’s upbringing, the trailblazing innovations 
of others, the advice of family and friends, and so forth. In many cases, moreover, the un-
humble individual will not merely ignore these sorts of factors: he will also situate himself, 
his projects and his achievements in some grand narrative; indeed, he may well accord them 
                                                     
13
 For a useful introduction, see Jeanine Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, 
Corruption, and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 107-11. 
14
 On this point, the views of those (such as Horner and Morgan) who believe that being humble involves having 
a lowly opinion of oneself must be distinguished from the views of those (such as Murdoch) who construe 
humility as a kind of selflessness. For those in the latter group, the humble person will neither overestimate nor 
underestimate her own worth or status, but will, by contrast, be free of the self-centredness that manifests itself 
in, amongst other things, a concern with such self-estimation. 
15
 See The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W. D. Ross; revised by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 4 (1094b). 
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major roles in that narrative. Consider, for example, the historian who concludes his textbook 
on world history with a long account of the value of his own contributions to intellectual life. 
Such a man could be humble, but it is unlikely, for the humble man will tend not to 
overestimate the significance of his projects in ‘the great scheme of things’. He is unlikely to 
believe that they have much significance on historical, geological or cosmic scales.
16
 
 
4. 
 
More would need to be said to prove the point, but grant, for the sake of argument, that 
humility is indeed a virtue. And grant, further, that the humble person is unlikely to 
overestimate the significance of his projects in any sufficiently great ‘scheme of things’. It 
remains to be shown how humility could relate to our dealings with old inanimate objects. 
To address this issue, we will need to reflect on a particular case in more detail. So, 
with the issues of humility and oldness in mind, consider the following true story drawn from 
the world of mountaineering. 
In 1959, Cesare Maestri, an accomplished Italian mountaineer, reported that he and 
his Austrian climbing partner, Toni Egger, had reached the summit of what had been written 
off as ‘an impossible mountain’ – Cerro Torre in Patagonia.17 Many greeted his report with 
scepticism. Why, it was asked, was the account of his route so vague? And why could no 
traces of his equipment be found on the upper reaches of the peak?
18
 Maestri said that the 
proof could be found in his companion’s camera, yet Egger had been swept away by an 
avalanche during their descent, and neither his body nor any of his possessions could be 
found. 
In 1970 Maestri returned to Cerro Torre, determined to silence the sceptics. To this 
end, he and his team hauled a petrol-powered compressor, weighing more than 300 pounds, 
up the south-east ridge of the mountain, driving in more than 400 climbing bolts along the 
way. By using the bolts, Maestri managed to reach the summit and descend safely, though he 
left the compressor on the mountain, dangling from the highest bolt.
19
 His actions were 
widely condemned. One might be forgiven, critics said, for knocking in a few bolts with a 
handheld hammer. But there could be no justification for driving in hundreds with a petrol-
powered compressor, especially when cracks and other natural hand- and footholds were 
available. 
 
5. 
 
                                                     
16
 This is unlikely but not impossible. A world historical individual, in Hegel’s sense, could conceivably be 
humble even if he were to appreciate the great historical significance of his actions. 
17
 Rolando Garibotti, ‘Cerro Torre – “An Impossible Mountain”’, Alpinist, 21 February, 2012, 
http://www.alpinist.com/doc/web12w/petition-in-favor [accessed 19 October 2012]. 
18
 Kelly Cordes, ‘Cerro Torre’s Cold Case’, National Geographic Adventure, 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/adventure/photography/patagonia/cerro-torre-maestri.html [accessed 19 
October 2012]. 
19
 More precisely, he reached the highest point on the rocky part of the mountain. The ice ‘mushroom’ which 
tops it was left unclimbed. In Maestri’s view, it was not part of the mountain proper (Jack Geldard, ‘David 
Lama and Cerro Torre; A Mountain Set Free’, UKClimbing.com, 
http://www.ukclimbing.com/news/item.php?id=66281 [accessed 19 October 2012]). 
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Setting aside the vexed question of whether Maestri and Egger really did reach the summit of 
Cerro Torre in 1959, it seems unlikely to me that a humble person, acting in character, would 
have acted as Maestri acted in 1970. But how is this impression to be justified? One way to 
proceed would be to adopt an agent-based conception of virtue ethics, à la Michael Slote, and 
to argue that Maestri’s actions were wrong, or in some other way deserving of moral 
criticism, simply because of the nature of the man’s motives. I do not wish to deny that such a 
strategy could bear fruit. As we will see below, Maestri’s motives were not beyond reproach. 
Moreover, perhaps Robert Sparrow is correct to say that an agent-based approach can be used 
to shed light on our moral relations to inanimate objects.
20
 Nevertheless I will not adopt an 
agent-based approach in what follows. I will argue that in order to explain why a humble 
person would not be inclined to adopt Maestri-esque climbing methods, one must refer not 
simply to the motives of climbers, but to something about Cerro Torre.  
What might this something be? It is clear, first, that the humble person would only 
have had reservations about Maestri’s use of the petrol-powered compressor because she took 
the mountain to be a distinct individual. Such a person would presumably have had no 
objections to throwing an ordinary lump of coal on the fire, for example, because an ordinary 
lump of coal is merely a representative of the undifferentiated ‘stuff’ we call ‘coal’. By 
contrast, Cerro Torre was not simply a mound of rock; it was (and is) something that has a 
synchronic and diachronic identity, and even a name.
21
 
 It appears, then, that a humble person could only have had reservations about the use 
of Maestri-esque climbing methods because she took the mountain to be a distinct individual. 
Yet the same could of course be said of Maestri. The Italian mountaineer had not travelled to 
Patagonia to climb any old mountain: his aim was to climb Cerro Torre. So if we are to 
explain how a humble person, qua humble, would be disposed to treat Cerro Torre it is not 
enough merely to note the mountain’s apparent individuality. 
 What other feature could Cerro Torre have possessed that (in the judgement of a 
humble person) would have rendered it inappropriate to adopt Maestri-esque climbing 
methods? Plausible candidates are hard to come by. Mountains are not sentient; nor are they 
alive.
22
 It could be argued that they are in some sense, and to some extent, natural.
23
 
                                                     
20
 ‘The Ethics of Terraforming’, Environmental Ethics 21 (3) (1999), pp. 227-45.  
21
 See further, E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 36-7. 
22
 True, if millennia were but seconds to us, mountains might look alive (cf. Andrew Brennan, ‘The Moral 
Standing of Natural Objects’, Environmental Ethics 6 (1984), pp. 35-56, at pp. 54-5). Viewed on fast-forward, 
the upsurge of mountain ranges and their subsequent erosion might resemble the growth and decline of fungi 
and plants. But those appearances would be deceptive, for a moment’s reflection reveals that the cases are 
entirely different. If an entity is alive, then it must be possible for certain effects to be bad or good for it. Even 
the simplest living things, such as protozoa, can flourish or be harmed. But nothing can be good or bad for 
mountains. For instance, although it might be bad for climbers or hill-farmers if a certain peak is eroded, it can 
be neither good nor bad for the mountain itself. Erosion can neither foster nor impede the flourishing of a 
mountain because a mountain is not the sort of thing that can flourish. Unlike organisms, mountains do not have 
‘goods’ of their own. And even if it were established that mountains do have such goods, further argument 
would be required to show that humble persons would tend to regard them as deserving any sort of special 
treatment, simply because they have goods.  (To be sure, Christopher Belshaw suggests that destroying any 
entity, even those which lack goods, is bad for the entity. If this is correct, then destroying a mountain – 
whatever that might involve - would be bad for the mountain. However, even if destroying a mountain would be 
bad for the mountain, it would, as Belshaw himself notes, be a further question whether we are morally obliged 
to refrain from that act of destruction. See Belshaw, Environmental Philosophy: Reason, Nature and Human 
Concern (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), pp. 149-53.) 
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However, even if it were to be established that Cerro Torre is in some sense natural, and even 
if writers like Andrew Brennan are correct to say that we have certain obligations to natural 
objects simply because they are natural – even if these points are granted, it is a further 
question whether a humble person, qua humble, would have judged the mountain to deserve 
special treatment simply because it is natural.
24
 Indeed, it is a further question to which the 
answer is likely to be ‘no’, for it is, on the face of it, difficult to see why a humble person, 
qua humble, would be disposed to regard natural objects as deserving of special treatment 
simply because they are natural. 
Another hypothesis is that the humble person would have judged it inappropriate to 
use high-impact climbing methods on Cerro Torre because she would have been impressed 
by the mountain’s great age. But although this hypothesis is more plausible than those 
mooted above, an appeal to age is in itself insufficient to explain the humble person’s 
response. Suppose that although Cerro Torre has existed for millennia, the particular form of 
the mountain in 1970 was the result of a major geological upheaval in 1969. If that were the 
case, it is not clear that a humble mountaineer would have had any significant qualms about 
using Maestri-esque methods to scale the peak. After all - she would have thought – although 
the mountain has existed for millennia, the rock faces I will need to scale have only existed 
for a year, so what does it matter if I drive bolts into them? 
 
6. 
 
In order to explain how a humble person, qua humble, would be disposed to treat Cerro Torre 
it is therefore insufficient to refer to the mountain’s apparent individuality, its great age, or to 
any of the other candidate features discussed in the previous section. In judging it 
inappropriate to use Maestri-esque methods, the humble person would have been responding 
to some other feature that she took the mountain to possess. 
But what feature? One suggestion is that the humble person would have been struck 
by the role that Cerro Torre played in certain stories or narratives. This is not, I think, an 
implausible suggestion. On the contrary, the form of the mountain – its near-vertical faces, its 
spectacular granite spire – clearly embodies certain stories or narratives. In particular, it 
embodies an immense natural history, involving the slow movements of tectonic plates, the 
upheaval of land masses and the relentless erosive effects of wind, rain and ice. Some people, 
indeed, will be able directly to perceive this history in Cerro Torre’s shape. For those with the 
requisite training, a whole series of geological upheavals will seem to be embodied in the 
mountain’s form, as an old man’s life is inscribed in the lines of his face.25 But even those of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
23
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough account of what it means to be natural. For a good 
introduction to the relevant issues, see John O’Neill, Alan Holland and Andrew Light (eds.) Environmental 
Values (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), Chapter 8. 
24
 Brennan (‘The Moral Standing of Natural Objects’, p. 41) argues that when an object counts as what he calls a 
‘whole natural individual’, rather than an organ, limb, branch, antenna or some other component of such an 
individual, then the fact that it is natural generates a moral obligation on the part of us moral agents to treat it 
with respect. The reason for this, he explains, is that whole natural individuals, unlike artefacts (such as 
hammers) and parts of whole natural individuals (such as livers), are not essentially means to ends and so ought 
not to be treated as such. 
25
 See further, Thomas Raab and Robert Frodeman, ‘What is it Like to be a Geologist? A Phenomenology of 
Geology and its Epistemological Implications’, Philosophy and Geography 5 (1) (2002), pp. 69-81. 
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us who lack this expertise know that the form of any mountain embodies not just a vast 
human history but an immense nonhuman, geological one as well. 
It is clear, then, that the sides of Cerro Torre were the products of millions of years of 
tectonic and erosive forces. Yet it is also clear that they were transformed in a geological 
moment by Maestri’s overzealous use of bolts. That, it might be said, was Maestri’s 
contribution to the story of Cerro Torre. That was the chapter he wrote. 
Although the tone of those remarks is clearly pejorative, I do not want to claim that 
Maestri’s contribution to Cerro Torre’s history was for the worse – either that it was in some 
sense bad for the mountain or that it was for some other reason to be regretted. So, for 
instance, I do not want to say that Cerro Torre had some special value that was diminished 
when Maestri blasted his compression bolts into it. But I do want to say that Maestri’s actions 
marked a drastic turn in the history of the mountain, a sudden and radical departure from 
what had, up till then, been a slowly-developing story of Cerro Torre’s formation and 
subsequent erosion. Indeed I want to say, further, that Maestri’s actions jarred with what, 
until 1970, had been the mountain’s history.26 
 This incongruity would not have been lost on Maestri. He must have known, as the 
petrol-driven compressor was hauled up the side of Cerro Torre, that his actions were going 
to mark a decisive moment in the mountain’s history. Yet any qualms he might have had 
about those actions’ effects were overridden by other considerations. When asked, in a 1972 
interview for Mountain, what drove him to climb, he said that ‘I wished to use climbing as a 
way of imposing my personality’.27 And it would seem that a similarly arrogant concern 
moved him to impose what would become known as the Compressor Route upon Cerro 
Torre. What really mattered to Maestri was, it would appear, his own story, the one in which 
he reaches the summit and, returning home, finally silences his critics. (‘I will humiliate 
them,’ he wrote, ‘and they will feel ashamed for having doubted me.’)28 For him, the 
mountain was little more than a means to that end. His actions in 1970 seem, therefore, to 
evince a lack of humility. They indicate that he overestimated the importance of his own 
endeavours in the great scheme of things; that he failed to recognise their insignificance when 
measured against the immense history embodied in the mountain. 
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26
 Cf. the claim that, when it comes to natural processes, ‘Change can be too much or too little, not by any 
simple quantitative measure, but by a qualitative measure of degree of disruption to narrative significance’ 
(O’Neill et al, Environmental Values, p. 157). Note, however, that I am not suggesting that to evaluate a course 
of action one need only note how it affects the relevant narratives (in the following, I argue that one must appeal 
to aretaic considerations too). Hence my argument is not vulnerable to the criticisms Katie McShane levels at 
narrative-focused approaches to ethics (see McShane, ‘Some Challenges for Narrative Accounts of Value’, 
Ethics and the Environment 17 (1) (2012), pp. 45-69). 
27
 Quoted in the Editors’ Note, ‘The Restoration of the Impossible’, Alpinist 20 (summer 2007), 
http://www.alpinist.com/doc/ALP20/editors-note-maestri [accessed 31 January 2013]. Cf. Maestri’s response to 
Walter Bonatti’s 1958 ascent of the Col of Hope on Cerro Torre’s southern flank: ‘Hope is the weapon of the 
weak, there is only the will to conquer.’ Maestri named the col on his side of the mountain the ‘Col of 
Conquest’. See further, Jim Donini, ‘Cerro Torre – the Lie and the Desecration’, Climbing, April 2009, 
http://www.climbing.com/route/cerro-torre-the-lie-and-the-desecration/ [accessed 31 January 2013]. 
28
 Quoted in Rolando Garibotti, Patagonia Online Climbing Guide, 
http://pataclimb.com/climbingareas/chalten/torregroup/torre/compresor.html [accessed 31 January 2013]. 
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We have been assuming that Cerro Torre is an old object: both that it is old now and that it 
was already old in 1970. Contrary to the rough and provisional definition I offered at the 
beginning of the paper, it does not qualify as old simply because it has existed for more than 
70 years. Nor does it count as old because it is old for a mountain (it is in fact much younger 
than many other peaks, such as those in the Laurentian range in eastern Canada). No, one of 
the reasons Cerro Torre qualifies as old is because it fits into certain narratives. And it is 
these narratives that would be salient for a humble person. It is not clear to me that such a 
person would necessarily see any value in Cerro Torre.
29
 However, she would be struck by 
the fact that the mountain’s form had taken such an immense amount of time to develop. And 
she would recognise that adopting high-impact climbing methods would probably result in a 
sudden and drastic change to that epic narrative. As a humble person, she would be 
disinclined to bring about such changes – disinclined, as it were, to put her stamp upon the 
mountain’s history. For this reason, she would be reluctant to emulate Maestri’s actions.30 
This narrative-based approach does not just apply to our dealings with natural objects 
such as mountains. Consider ancient artefacts.
31
 In many cases, what will impress itself upon 
the humble person is not simply the great age of such objects, not simply (to use a strained 
metaphor) the large number of miles they have on the clock, but the fact that they have 
managed to survive for such a long period of time. Is it not remarkable, the humble person 
will think, that this ancient statue has survived for so long, when so many others were 
destroyed? And in her judgement, the fact that the object may be associated with such a 
narrative provides a reason to handle it with care (if, that is, it must be handled at all). It is not 
necessary that she believe the object to have any significant financial, aesthetic or moral 
value. Moreover, she might not think that it would mark a tragic end to that object’s narrative 
if it were to be broken. But she will recognise that that event would mark a sudden and 
dramatic turn in that epic story (indeed, it is likely to mark its end) and, as a humble person, 
she will, all things considered, be reluctant to bring about such drastic changes. 
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29
 It is true that the humble person would tend to regard Cerro Torre as making some moral demands upon her. 
But it is not clear to me that these demands must be capable of being expressed in terms of the value she sees in 
the mountain. For a defence of the claim that an object can exert a moral ‘pull’ upon agents even if it is not 
valued, see Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 
41-8; cf. Katie McShane, ‘Neosentimentalism and the valence of attitudes’, Philosophical Studies (online first), 
pp. 1-19, at pp. 14-5.   
30
 It is not clear to me that she would necessarily respect the mountain. As noted above, respect is something 
that is called for by an object. But it is not clear, in the case we are considering, whether a humble person’s 
respect would be for the mountain, or simply for its history (if any such distinction can legitimately be made). 
Nevertheless, whether or not a humble woman would deem objects such as Cerro Torre to deserve respectful 
treatment, she would judge them to be worthy of special treatment, and it is for this reason, I would suggest, that 
she would be reluctant to emulate Maestri’s actions. 
31
 Although, in the following, I suggest that an appeal to humility can provide one with reasons to take care in 
one’s dealings with natural objects and artefacts alike, I do not mean to suggest that the two sorts of cases will 
raise an identical set of issues. On the moral significance of our dealings with ancient artefacts, see Chris Scarre 
and Geoffrey Scarre, The Ethics of Archaeology: Philosophical Perspectives on Archaeological Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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To recap: old objects, qua old, will typically embody, indicate, or in some other way relate to, 
certain stories or narratives, and humble persons will take these narratives into consideration 
in their practical deliberations.
32
 So, as we saw in the Cerro Torre case, a humble person 
would, all things being equal, be disinclined to act in ways that would result in a drastic 
change in the mountain’s narrative. For her, such actions would be inappropriate. 
 These claims need to be qualified in three ways. First, I do not want to go so far as to 
claim that an object’s age per se will be of no account at all to a humble person. So, to stick 
with the example of Cerro Torre, if the mountain’s form in 1970 was the result of a 
geological upheaval one year previously, then a humble climber might have had few qualms 
about using Maestri-esque methods to climb it. But he might nonetheless have had some 
misgivings – and, moreover, he might have had these misgivings precisely because the 
mountain – if not its current form – had existed for millennia. The example of the ancient 
statue can be treated in the same way. If, on the one hand, hundreds of thousands of identical 
statues had been produced in ancient times, of which most had survived to the present day, 
then it is not clear that a twenty-first century humble person would be disposed to treat any 
particular statue with special care. So the shape or ‘arc’ of the statue’s narrative matters. On 
the other hand, however, it is not clear that a humble person would necessarily have any 
reason to treat a particular statue with special care if it was the only surviving representative 
of a batch that was manufactured in 1990. So age would seem to matter as well. 
 Second, I do not mean to suggest that it will always be easy to determine what 
adopting a humble comportment towards an object would involve. Consider the ‘ancient 
statue’ example. It may be unclear whether a humble person would take pains to restore the 
object to its original state, or whether they would, by contrast, be disposed to leave it alone. 
Resolving the matter may well require no small measure of practical wisdom. 
 Moreover – and this is my third qualification – although I have argued that an appeal 
to humility can furnish one with reasons to desist from treating old inanimate objects in 
certain ways, I have not claimed that such reasons are overriding. They are not. For example, 
even if the argument set out above is well taken and an appeal to humility can provide one 
with a reason not to attempt to restore a certain ancient statue to its original state, that reason 
need not prove decisive. While a humble person might recognise that there are reasons to 
leave the statue untouched (or at least to take care if one chooses to restore it), she might 
judge that the statue ought nonetheless to be restored – because doing so would greatly 
enhance its aesthetic value, for instance.
33
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32
 A comprehensive account would provide much more detail about the various forms the relevant relation could 
take. Developing such an account is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, for a good 
introduction to the ways that natural objects can relate (e.g., allude, express, embody) to narratives, see David E. 
Cooper, A Philosophy of Gardens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 113-22.  
33
 Ronald Sandler makes a similar point with regard to the claim that promoting genetically modified crops 
betrays a lack of humility. Given the considerable benefits such crops can bring, an appeal to humility need not 
provide an overriding reason against breeding them. Sandler, ‘A Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically 
Modified Crops’, in R. Sandler and P. Cafaro (eds.), Environmental Virtue Ethics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005), pp. 215-32, at p. 226. 
12 
 
So far, we have restricted our attention to particular objects. The reason for this is obvious: 
when our actions affect objects they tend to affect particular objects, not kinds of objects. If I 
decide to vandalise a Roman cameo vase, my actions affect that particular vase: they do not 
affect the kinds denoted by the word ‘vase’ or the phrase ‘Roman cameo vase’. But this is not 
always the case. Consider, by contrast, the manipulation of genomes. Biotechnology does not 
just involve the manipulation of particular genomes. In some instances, the guiding aim is to 
manipulate a kind of genome and by so doing to alter what it means to be an organism of a 
certain kind. 
It would, I think, be interesting to consider whether such actions are vulnerable to the 
line of criticism developed above.
34
 One can see how the basic argument would go. It would 
begin with the observation that the genome of any naturally occurring organism is the result 
of millions of years of evolution and, as such, embodies a vast natural history. And it would 
then be argued that a humble biotechnologist would typically be reluctant to alter such 
genomes in ways that jar with that grand narrative. And this, it would be concluded, can 
provide an overridable reason against making radical changes to genomes. 
There is not enough space, here, to develop that argument. My aim in this paper has 
been more modest: to show that old inanimate objects typically deserve special treatment, not 
simply because they are old, but because they tend to embody - or in some other way relate to 
- narratives that humble people will take seriously in their practical deliberations. That, I have 
argued, is one reason why we should take care in our dealings with such things as ancient 
rock formations, Egyptian sarcophagi and Ming vases. That is one reason why such things 
deserve special treatment. 
                                                     
34
 For other humility-based criticisms of biotechnology, see Sparrow, ‘The Ethics of Terraforming’ and David 
E. Cooper ‘The ‘Frankensteinian’ Nature of Biotechnology’, in eds. A-H. Maehle and J. Geyer-Kordesch, 
Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics: From Paternalism to Autonomy? (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002). 
